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Brain Branding: When Neuroscience and Commerce Collide
Abstract
Products that align themselves with basic and clinical neurosciences do well in the market. There are
reasons to be wary about such "brain branding" when commercial interests threaten to compromise
scientific and clinical values. We describe three concerns. The first, exemplified in drug development and
dissemination, is of the insidious effects of blurred boundaries between academia and industry. The
second, exemplified by the sale of brain fitness products, if of commerce getting ahead of the motivating
science. The first, exemplified by some functional imaging practices, if of the misuse of neuroscience in
the marketing technology. We propose three reasons for why brain branding appears to work. First is the
seductive allure of neuroscience as providing seemingly deeper explanations of complex phenomena.
The second is the persuasive power of pictures, which converges with the allure of neuroscience in brain
imaging. The third is the context in which many physicians and patients find themselves. The relative lack
of control over the course of chronic diseases may dispose physicians and patients to believe claims
made by companies that align themselves with neuroscience. We outline circumstances when clinicians,
patients, and consumers should question the usefulness of diagnostic tools and therapeutic
interventions.
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interests threaten to compromise scientific and clinical values. We describe three concerns. The first, exemplified in drug development and dissemination, is of the
insidious effects of blurred boundaries between academia and industry. The second, exemplified by the sale of brain fitness products, is of commerce getting ahead of
the motivating science. The third, exemplified by some functional imaging practices, is of the misuse of neuroscience in marketing technology. We propose three reasons
for why brain branding appears to work. First is the seductive allure of neuroscience as providing seemingly deeper explanations of complex phenomena. The second
is the persuasive power of pictures, which converges with the allure of neuroscience in brain imaging. The third is the context in which many physicians and patients
find themselves. The relative lack of control over the course of chronic diseases may dispose physicians and patients to believe claims made by companies that align
themselves with neuroscience. We outline circumstances when clinicians, patients, and consumers should question the usefulness of diagnostic tools and therapeutic
interventions.
Keywords: brain games, marketing, neuroethics, neuroimaging, neurotechnology, SPECT scan

Brains make money. Increasingly, commercial products align themselves with basic and clinical neuroscience research
(Lynch 2009). Recognizing this trend, the Neurotechnology Industry Organization (NIO), a recently created trade
group, “is working on programs that could translate into
millions of dollars to your company’s bottom-line and billions of dollars for commercial neuroscience” (NIO 2010).
Certainly, we should celebrate the fact that neuroscience is
coming of age and delivering on the promise of innovative
technologies that will have an impact on the way that we diagnose and treat disease. However, we should also be wary
of promises likely to fall short. In this article, we review
some reasons these promises should be viewed with skepticism. These situations involve potential conflicts between
values motivating bench and clinical science and those that
drive the market.
Scientists ideally believe in the value of knowledge and
advancing our understanding of the world. Social value is
added when this knowledge is translated into precise diagnostic tools and effective therapies. Commercial value is
added when these technologies are sold in an open market.
Here, in the context of clinical neuroscience, we consider
how commercial values can undermine scientific and social
values. The concerns we raise are by no means confined
to clinical neuroscience. In some form, they exist in all divisions of medicine. However, the tremendous growth of
neuroscience knowledge in recent years, the hold that neuroscience has on the public imagination, and the vulnerability of the population in need of neuroscience technologies,

combined with potentially huge financial gains, give “brain
brands” a special place in this evolving market.
We start with the principle that diagnostic tools and
therapeutic interventions should conform to professional
standards of care, and ideally they should be grounded in
clinical and scientific evidence. Products sold in violation of
this principle are suspect. Such violations arouse three kinds
of concern. One concern is simply that blurring boundaries
between academia and industry can insidiously compromise scientific and clinical standards. The second concern
is that marketing can get ahead of the science; that is, neuroscience is used prematurely as a marketing tool to sell
products. The third concern is that products can be sold by
misusing neuroscience. We offer examples of each of these
concerns. Our goal here is not to diminish the excitement
over current and potential medical uses of neuroscience.
Our goal is to highlight brain-branding practices of which
we might be wary. Furthermore, we consider why people
buy into brain branding claims even when caution is called
for.
BLURRING BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ACADEMIA AND
INDUSTRY
Neuropsychiatry drugs such as Zoloft and Ritalin represent some of the first and most successful of the “brain
brands.” These and other incredibly successful pharmaceutical brands developed since 1980, when the Bayh–Dole Act
allowed universities to retain ownership of patents generated from federally funded research, are products of a
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complex and evolving relationship between academia and
industry. By 2000, industry’s share of investment in biomedical research grew from 32% to 62%, while the federal government’s share fell inversely (Bekelman, Li, and Gross
2003). Neuroscience funding followed these trends, with
industry funding growing from 52% to 58% between 1995
and 2005 (Dorsey et al. 2006). More generally, by the mid
1990s, more than 90% of life sciences companies were
involved in academic research, and 68% of universities
held equity in companies that sponsored their faculty
(Blumenthal 2003). As of 2003, one-quarter of academic
biomedical investigators were sponsored by industry,
and one-third had personal financial ties with industry
(Bekelman, Li, and Gross 2003).
Academic–industry collaborations can be extremely
beneficial. Working synergistically, these collaborations
have been instrumental in producing several effective drugs
(Chin-Dusting et al. 2005; Maxwell 1990). Multimilliondollar partnerships between academic neuroscience
research and industry are currently under way. For example, the University of Maryland received $24 million from
the pharmaceutical company Novartis (Basel, Switzerland)
to collaborate in investigating treatments for schizophrenia
(University of Maryland Medical Center 1999). Under optimal circumstances commercial interests need not compromise scientific and clinical values. Unfortunately, optimal
circumstances are not always the rule.
Academic–industry links can compromise scientific integrity in several ways. They can bias scientific research,
have undue influence on clinical practice, and introduce
other forms of conflict of interest. Studies sponsored by
industry are almost four times as likely to restrict sharing their data and to report pro-industry conclusions
(Bekelman, Li, and Gross 2003; Lexchin et al. 2003). Clinical trials often report incomplete or biased results (Rising,
Bacchetti, and Bero 2008). For example, 51% of Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) trials on 12 antidepressant
medications had positive results, while 94% of published
trials considered the drugs favorably (Turner et al. 2008).
The reasons for these publication biases are not always clear.
Perhaps in response to these concerns, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) is setting
up a clinical studies results database that is designed to
be widely accessible and with results presented in a standardized format (ClinicalStudyResults 2010). This database
is not designed to replace the FDA, but is motivated by a
desire for full scientific disclosure.
The integrity of academic literature can be compromised
in other ways. For example, some physicians accept authorship of scientific papers drafted by ghostwriters working for drug companies (Gøtzsche et al. 2009). In the past,
this practice occurred in about 10% of published articles
(Flanagin et al. 1998; Mowatt et al. 2002). Healy, a psychiatrist quoted in (Collier 2009), says, “The biggest problem
isn’t the ghostwriting, per se, but the lack of access to raw
data to check against the conclusions.” For publicly funded
research, access to the raw data is on the rise as agencies like
the U.S. National Institutes of Health require that the raw
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data from publicly funded clinical trials be placed in a registry that has met criteria established by the World Health
Organization and the International Committee of Medical
Journals Editors (Collier 2009). Beyond the issue of data access is the fact that the article may be biased by industry’s
financial interest in the outcome.
Today’s medical journals are not only vehicles of
academic exchange. They are filled with advertisements
intended to influence clinical practice. A recent study of
psychiatric drug advertisements in 69 medical journals examined the availability of sources cited and the accuracy
of the claims. Just over half of the advertisements’ claims
provided no attainable source. When sources were found
for claims of drug efficacy, they were only supported by the
sources on 53.2% of occasions (Speilmans 2008).
Industry can influence clinical practice in ways that
are of concern. A 2001 national survey found that 96%
of off-label neuropsychiatric drug prescriptions written
had little or no scientific support (Radley, Finkelstein, and
Stafford 2006). Fines have been levied on drug companies
for improperly promoting neuropsychiatric drugs (Mello,
Studdert, and Brennan 2009). Pfizer’s recent $2.3 billion settlement for such alleged marketing practices was its fourth
fine since 2002 (Harris 2009). Other channels of industry
influence on clinical practice can be insidious. A 2003–2004
national survey found that 94% of responding physicians
interacted with the pharmaceutical industry. They received
free meals (83%), drug samples (78%), support for continuing medical education (35%) and payments for lectures or
clinical trials (28%) (Campbell et al. 2007). While most physicians think that gifts do not influence their behavior, the data
suggest otherwise (Harris 2009; Wazana 2000). Physicians
who receive free drug samples are more likely to prescribe
expensive and newer drugs without basing these decisions
on accurate medical information (Wazana 2000). Physicians
who engage in educational events sponsored by industry,
or have their travel expenses subsidized by industry, are
more likely to prescribe the sponsor’s drugs over competitors (Wazana 2000). Physicians that receive research funding
and honoraria and interact with pharmaceutical representatives are more likely to request that their sponsor’s drug be
added to their hospital’s formulary (Chren and Landefeld
1994).
Academic “thought leaders” with potential conflicts of
interest can have a profound impact on treatment practices
by influencing diagnostic norms. Diagnosing many neuropsychiatric disorders lacks precision, in part because these
pathologic conditions do not often have clear and causally
linked biomarkers. This lack of diagnostic precision can be
of concern if the people who establish disease criteria and
treatment guidelines have close ties to industry. Of the 170
panel members who contributed to DSM–IV (1994) and
DSM–IV–TR (2000), 56% reported one or more financial
associations with the pharmaceutical industry (Cosgrove
et al. 2006). The entire panels on mood disorders (n = 8)
and schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders (n = 7) reported financial ties to industry (Cosgrove et al. 2006). Of the
20 authors of clinical practice guidelines for schizophrenia,
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bipolar disorder, and major depressive disorder, 90% had at
least one undisclosed financial tie to companies selling drugs
that were explicitly or implicitly identified in the guidelines
(Cosgrove et al. 2009). Psychological research suggests that
individuals are often unaware of how their affiliations can
bias their decisions (Moore, Tanlu, and Bazerman 2010).
Neuropsychiatric drugs are developed and sold in a
context where boundaries between academia and industry
have become blurred. We are not suggesting that such close
ties are problematic in principle. However, in some cases the
result of these blurring boundaries is biased scientific literature and concerning clinical practices. Recently, PhRMA
has published guidelines to mitigate the influence of commercial interests on the integrity of academic literature and
clinical practices. However, because these guidelines remain
voluntary, they should be taken with a “big grain of salt”
(Goldstein 2009). While high-profile incidents receive considerable media attention, some question the pervasiveness
of these compromises (Stossel 2005). Conflict of interest regulation in the extreme can itself be counterproductive to
medical innovation and research (Stossel 2007). Ultimately,
it is bias rather than conflict of interest that is the cause for
concern, and bias is much harder to identify (Schwid and
Gross 2005). For example, a neuropsychiatrist developing
practice guidelines may have financial ties to a drug company, constituting a conflict of interest. But this conflict is
not a problem unless it biases recommendations, and colleagues remain unaware of these ties. Neuroscientists and
physicians should be vigilant about the ways in which the
development and marketing of brain-branded drugs can
compromise scientific values and clinical practices.
THE PREMATURE USE OF NEUROSCIENCE IN THE
MARKETPLACE
We focused on pharmaceutical companies in discussing the
insidious effects of blurring boundaries between academia
and industry. The development and deployment of pharmaceuticals are highly regulated. A different kind of concern
arises with unregulated health care products introduced
into the marketplace before evidence of their efficacy has
been established. Prime examples of such products are cognitive software programs. These “brain fitness” programs
target clinical populations, but are not subject to regulations
and standards associated with traditional medical interventions.
Currently, about 30 million people have dementia
worldwide. Given that older people are deeply concerned about cognitive decline (Connell, Scott Roberts, and
McLaughlin 2007) and treatments for dementia have limited
efficacy, anything that could stave off this decline is desirable. Any such intervention would also be poised to make
a substantial profit. This is where brain fitness programs
come in.
The rationale for brain fitness programs rests on observations that active mental engagement is associated with
decreased cognitive decline (Verghese et al. 2003) and that
adult brains are more plastic than previously appreciated
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(Lie et al. 2004). For example, the hippocampus has neurogenerative capabilities well into adulthood, suggesting
that memory systems are subject to ongoing modulation
(Kitabatake et al. 2007). Thus, it is plausible that behavioral
interventions that promote such modulation would benefit
people with cognitive decline.
The current evidence suggests that behavioral interventions can improve cognitive performance in adults including the elderly, and these gains can be maintained for several
years (Schmiedek 2010). “Positive transfer” or the transfer of
trained abilities to other domains is typically limited (Owen
2010). For training to significantly impact lives, it must not
only improve skills relevant to the task, but also improve
abilities that translate into something useful in people’s
everyday lives. Two recent studies did demonstrate some
positive transfer across domains. One study (n = 49) employing mindfulness meditation showed that brief, 20minute sessions of meditative focus on breath improved
visuo-spatial processing, working memory, executive functioning, and attention (Zeidan 2010). A second study
showed that 100 days of intensive one-hour-long cognitive training using software and pen-and-paper working
memory, processing speed, and episodic memory tasks
showed improvements in tasks similar to those practiced
(Schmiedek 2010). Whether these improvements would be
maintained over time remains to be seen.
Despite these recent findings and the plausibility of the
hypothesis that behavioral interventions might halt or reverse cognitive decline, direct, reliable evidence in support
of the efficacy of brain software programs is sparse. A recent
meta-analysis of the existing data on brain fitness programs
points out several common shortcomings in this research
(Papp, Walsh, and Snyder 2009). These shortcomings include the fact that definition of what constitutes adequate
improvement is lacking, follow-up times are limited, active
matched control conditions are often missing, and few outcome measures show changes in people’s daily activities.
A major limitation of most research on brain fitness programs is that much of the research on cognitive software is
sponsored by the companies themselves and is conducted
by authors with a financial stake in the outcome of the studies reported. For example, one of the first studies using Posit
Science (San Fransisco, CA) software reported modest improvements with trained auditory memory among older
non-demented participants. The authors reported that the
effect generalized to nontrained neuropsychological tests
and was sustained for 3 months. All 10 authors held stock
or options in the company and most of them worked for the
company (Mahncke et al. 2006). The paper was published
in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) as a
“communication” by the senior author, Michael Merzenich,
who is a founder of the company. Such papers are not subject to the rigors of the traditional peer-review process. As
of January 1, 2009, PNAS no longer consider submissions
using this route if the academy member or coauthors disclose a significant financial conflict of interest. A subsequent
larger study (n = 487) also reported modest improvement
in auditory memory (Smith et al. 2009). To its credit, this
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study included an active control group. The two principle co-investigators were not employed by and did not
hold equity in the company. However, Posit Science funded
the study, and three authors received consulting fees and
a fourth held stock options and was employed by Posit
Science, again raising the specter of bias in the study. The
program currently sells commercially for $395 for a one-user
version and $495 for a two-user version. Of course, it does
not necessarily follow that researchers with financial conflicts of interest will by definition produce biased results.
However, it would be helpful in making efficacy assessments to have more studies conducted with specific brain
fitness programs by investigators with no financial interest
in the product’s commercial success.
In addition to shortcomings of research methods, many
studies in which subjects train using brain fitness software
fail to show that training generalizes to abilities outside the
tasks trained. One of the largest studies on brain fitness software, a trial on cognitive training with 2,832 participants,
showed that memory training and speed of processing training provided some benefits within the domains trained but
the benefits did not consistently generalize to other domains
(Willis et al. 2006). However, reasoning training with a live
instructor improved instrumental activities of daily living.
Notably, some of the benefits in instrumental activities of
daily living were sustained 5 years after the training. Identifying characteristics (such as higher education and age)
that predict response to training is critical, and active research on this question is underway (Langbaum et al. 2009).
In the largest and most recent study to date, more than
11,000 participants enrolled in a 6-week online brain fitness
program. The game was designed to improve reasoning,
memory, planning, visuospatial skills, and attention. The
authors found that participants improved on each of these
cognitive areas, but there was no generalization to untrained
tasks, even those that were closely related to the cognitive
domains being trained (Owen et al. 2010).
Brain fitness companies employ several tactics to divert
attention away from the limited evidence of efficacy for their
products. They align their programs with related, even if
not directly applicable, neuroscience findings. MindSparke
Brain Fitness, sold by “Mind Evolve” (Minneapolis, MN),
founded by a philosopher, aligns its product with research showing that software-based training improves
working memory and “fluid intelligence” (Jaeggi et al. 2008;
Klingberg et al. 2005; Mind Evolve 2009). The company
claims that this is the only brain fitness product proven
to improve intelligence. The original study included a very
demanding working memory task, which minimized the
ability of participants to develop automatic and task specific
strategies. Mind Evolve claims that training for 30 minutes
per day with its program increases working memory by
50% to 80%, and increases “fluid intelligence” by more than
40% in less than 20 days (Mind Evolve 2009). Whether or not
these claims are true remains uncertain, since the software
being sold is an adaptation of what was used in the original
study. It is not obvious that the software scales difficulty
in a way that the original investigators thought was critical
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for the effects that they reported. The study sponsored by
Posit Science assessing the impact of 40 hours of training
with Brain Fitness in healthy elderly adults found improvements in auditory processing speed and attention (Smith
et al. 2009). From these findings, the company claims that
the program produces “an improvement in memory equivalent to approximately 10-years” (Posit Science 2009). R.
Petersen notes that Posit Science has not thus far tested the
longevity of the Brain Fitness improvements past 3 months
and questions the real-world significance of their outcomes
(quoted in Ellison 2007).
Other companies cite peer-reviewed research involving
company software, but their claims do not always match
the actual findings. CogniFit (New York, NY), producer of
“personalized brain fitness,” states that “99.9% of 972 users
showed improvement in at least one cognitive ability after
eight weeks training” and that subjects improved an average of eight abilities (CogniFit 2009). The study in which
the software was featured tested the impact of insomnia on
cognitive capacity and did not assess whether the software
improved cognition (Haimov, Hanuka, and Horowitz 2008).
Other studies cited on the company website are in abstract
form and to date are not published in peer-reviewed journals. As such, they are not subject to the kind of scientific
scrutiny that is helpful in determining the usefulness of such
interventions.
Companies that sell brain fitness software programs
enhance their credibility by relying on the authority of
scientists that design the products or others that have company affiliation. Lumosity (San Francisco, CA) has a scientific advisory board of academicians from Stanford, CA,
and the University of California–San Francisco. The company claims that its training improves memory and attention, but no scientific data using the actual software are
offered (Lumos 2009). Nintendo (Kyoto, Japan) uses this
approach to great effect. According to its website, more
than 10 million people worldwide include playing Brain
Age games in their daily lives (Nintendo 2009). According to Nintendo, Ryuta Kawashima, a neuroscientist who
specializes in brain imaging, inspired Brain Age and is featured in the game. He claims that daily training with these
games helps prevent cognitive decline because it enhances
blood flow to the prefrontal cortex. These claims are derived
from a study of 32 people with Alzheimer’s disease. Half
the participants were given reading and math tasks and the
other half, no intervention. The training group, unlike the
control group, showed improvements on assessments of
frontal lobe functions and were observed to be more communicative than before the intervention (Kawashima et al.
2005). However, the authors acknowledge that they could
not determine the role of social and emotional factors resulting from the special attention given to the treatment
group over the 6 months of the study. The same treatment
has since been introduced in more than 300 nursing homes
in Japan (Fuyuno 2007). Kawashima says he uses the royalties from the game on his research and is not interested in
conducting more detailed studies on the effects of the game
(Fuyuno 2007).
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In summary, brain fitness programs are examples of
products that are designed with plausible scientific rationales. However, in these cases commerce has moved ahead
of the science. Hypotheses that might be tested with the
software are portrayed as foregone conclusions. The marketing of these products often exaggerates or misrepresents
the science motivating their production. For credibility the
companies rely on the authority of scientists, embellished
by anecdotal testimonials. Some of these products may ultimately turn out to be effective. However, they are sold in
the market before their efficacy has been established.
Many scientists might be uneasy about the fact that
other entrepreneur scientists are willing to leave academia
and enter the market place. Underlying this unease is the
concern that they might forego basic tenets of the scientific
methods in order to promote their wares. Despite this discomfort, one might reasonably ask the following question.
Even if these products are not efficacious, what is the harm
in them? Brain fitness programs keep older individuals occupied and can give them the sense that they are taking
an active part in maintaining their health. The risks seem
quite trivial compared to potential side effects of drugs. It
seems reasonable that the sale of these programs would not
be subject to the same regulatory scrutiny levied on pharmaceutical companies.
We would argue that it is precisely this lack of scrutiny
that opens the way for companies to make claims that are
not always justifiable. Furthermore, for older people with
fixed incomes and limited resources, costs of several hundred dollars may not be trivial. In addition, the fact that
these products might sequester the elderly away from more
engaging activities might itself be of concern.
THE MISUSE OF NEUROSCIENCE IN THE MARKETPLACE
Practices that violate basic norms of scientific and clinical
practices arouse considerable concern. The use of functional
brain imaging to diagnose neuropsychiatric conditions exemplifies this misuse of neuroscience.
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) does not
support the use of functional brain imaging for the diagnosis of neuropsychiatric illnesses in children, adolescents, or adults (American Psychiatric Association 2006),
with the exception of judicious use of positron emission tomography scans in patients suspected of having dementia.
Functional imaging in its current form lacks the sensitivity and specificity needed to reliably diagnose individuals
with neuropsychiatric diseases. Activity patterns in normal
and diseased brains often overlap. Group findings comparing mean activation patterns are not easily applied to
individuals. Because psychiatric diagnoses are often classified by symptoms, classical diseases often share clinical features with other disorders. Thus, activation patterns do not
sort easily into distinct clinical disorders. Clinical inferences
drawn from these images often assume that the presence or
absence of activation in a brain region is specific to a particular cognitive process or symptom, an assumption not
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usually justified (Poldrack 2006). The status of imaging in
the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders remains elusive and,
at this writing, may simply be a “pipe dream” (Poldrack
2009).
Neuropsychiatric diseases can be difficult to diagnose.
They rely on subjective reports and often have overlapping
clinical features. Objective diagnostic modalities with high
sensitivity and specificity are desirable. The marketing of
the diagnostic use of brain imaging can exploit this desire.
For example, the Amen Clinics (Newport Beach, CA) use
SPECT imaging to help diagnose and manage many neuropsychiatric illnesses. The Amen Clinics website claims
that based on their imaging, they have identified seven different types of anxiety and depression, six different types of
attention deficit disorder, and five different types of obesity.
Their use of imaging extends medical diagnostic considerations to help with interpersonal issues. The Amen Clinics
website cites an example of a couple having marital difficulties. The husband was found to have a “swiss cheese”
appearance on his SPECT scan, which led to the discovery
that he was being exposed to toxins in the factory where he
worked (Amen Clinics 2009c). In another example, finding
decreased activity in the left temporal lobe and prefrontal
cortex on the SPECT scan of a child (Amen 2009a) led the
clinician to conclude that a child had impulsive aggression
for which anticonvulsant and stimulant medications were
prescribed. These examples of the Amen Clinics practices
violate the standard of care. An adequate history and clinical
examination would have revealed the relevant information
and would have been sufficient to establish a rational clinical intervention. There was no reason to obtain functional
neuroimaging for diagnostic purposes in these cases.
Amen Clinics, Inc., has scanned more than 50,000 patients at a cost close to $170 million (Amen 2009b). There
is no systematic analysis of whether these thousands of
studies are better than treatment as usual by psychiatrists
(Leuchter 2009). The Brain Imaging Council of the Society of
Nuclear Medicine offered to submit Dr. Amen’s analysis of
a blinded set of SPECT scans to determine the effectiveness
of his technique at correctly diagnosing subjects. Dr. Amen
declined this offer to provide empirical support for his clinical approach (Adinoff and Devous 2010). He has been critiqued in the press by Salon (Burton 2008) for his practices,
including making claims that Alzheimer’s disease can be
prevented, and by Quackwatch (Hall 2007) for misleading
patients during informed consent by not revealing that the
American Psychiatric Association has warned of potential
harm with SPECT scanning for children. He has also been
critiqued in the scientific literature for the dangers in his
approach (Adinoff and Devous 2010): the administration
of radioactive isotopes without sound clinical rationale, the
treatments contingent on SPECT interpretations that lack
empirical support, and the potential detraction from clinically sound treatments.
Despite these critiques, Dr. Amen adds to his public
credibility by appearing on more than a thousand “blockbuster fundraising shows” for public television, shows that
are not vetted for their science (Burton 2008). Even a Public
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Broadcasting Service (PBS) ombudsman has raised cautions
about the misleading ways in which the program featuring
Dr. Amen is broadcast (Getler 2008). The program is distributed to PBS by Executive Program Services and PBS
does not evaluate the content of the program in any way. In
response to criticisms, Joe Campbell, Vice-President of PBS
Fundraising Programming, as cited in Getler (2008), stated:

history and exam, it is not clear that SPECT scans add to
the diagnostic utility or rationally guide treatment. At the
same time, these scans subject people to unwarranted risks
of radiation.

One of the more confusing parts of public television is that individual stations get their programs from a variety of sources, not
just from PBS. While we provide the bulk of the programs you
see on your local station, many of those programs come from
places like the BBC, alternative public television distributors,
like American Public Television, and independent distributors.
An easy way to tell if a program is from PBS is by looking for
the “PBS Logo” that appears at the end of every program we
distribute.

Given the concerns about brain branding, why do people
buy into these claims? We suggest that three factors contribute to people’s susceptibility to this kind of marketing:
the allure of neuroscience, the power of images, and the
potential vulnerability of patients.

“Change Your Brain, Change Your Life” was distributed by one
of those independent distributors, not by PBS. They offered the
program to public television stations across the country, and the
individual stations decided whether or not to use it according
to their own local standards. I hope you will forward your
concerns to the station(s) in your viewing area. They may not
be aware of the issues you raise about the program. Thank you
again for letting us know about your concerns.

To date, there has been no serious attempt by PBS to evaluate
the science of shows provided by third parties and shown
on its television stations.
The commercial success of the Amen Clinics appears
to serve as a model approach for other companies. The
Clements Clinic (Plano, TX) uses a similar strategy. In fact
Dr. Clements worked in the Amen Clinics from 2006 before becoming the medical director of the clinic that bears
his name in late 2008. For example, the Clements Clinic
website (The Clements Clinic) states, “Our brain affects everything you do: how you think, how you feel and how you
act. When your brain doesn’t work right, you don’t work
right. But how can we know how your brain is functioning unless we look? Unlike other physicians, psychiatrists
have not had the means to routinely look at the organ they
treat—the brain. Finally, with new advanced medical technology, that is changing.” The site claims that the clinic’s
SPECT scans enables it to evaluate areas of brain that work
well, areas of the brain that work too hard and areas of
the brain that do not work hard enough. It goes on to say,
“Armed with these images, we can more precisely diagnose
problems, target treatments and tailor therapies.” Michael
Uszler at DrSpectscan.com uses a similar strategy. The website claims, “After all, who would have a fracture treated
without first getting an x-ray or a scan to see exactly what
it look [sic] like? Makes sense, doesn’t it. I’m Dr. Michael
Uszler and I do brain SPECT scans on children and adults
to help them literally see for themselves how their brain
is working.” BraininSpect.com (Silicon Valley Brain Spect
Imaging, Inc.) employs a similar approach in Silicon Valley.
Again, patients are paying thousands of dollars for these diagnostic procedures that insurance companies do not cover
(Farah 2009). In each of these cases, with a proper clinical
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WHY ARE PEOPLE VULNERABLE TO BRAIN
BRANDING?

The Allure of Neuroscience
People believe explanations couched in neuroscience verbiage. The persuasive power of neuroscience is evident in
political commentary, marketing, and even court deliberations (Aguirre 2008; Dresser 2010; Mast and Zaltman 2005;
Morse 2006). Weisberg and colleagues refers to this phenomenon as “the seductive allure of neuroscience.” They
reported that people find behavioral explanations with neuroscience verbiage more satisfying than those without such
language, even when the neuroscience information adds
nothing to the explanation (Weisberg et al. 2008). In fact, the
neuroscience verbiage disproportionately impairs people’s
ability to detect logical flaws in bad explanations.
People find neuroscience explanations alluring for
many reasons. Neuroscience language is reductionist (Trout
2008) and is appealing because it is concrete and appears
technical and objective. Neuroscience descriptions are easily misconstrued as providing causal explanations, which
people prefer over descriptions of covariation of complex
phenomena (Brem and Rips 2000). People are also not
good at judging the validity of complicated explanations
(Evans 1993; Keil 2005). They accept inappropriate teleological explanations, are distracted by seductive details, and
fail to recognize logical circularities (Harp and Mayer 1998;
Lombrozo and Carey 2006; Rips 2002). Despite not being
good at judging the quality of explanations, people overestimate their own abilities to explain complex phenomena
(Keil 2003).
Thus, it appears that the appeal of seemingly causal explanations combined with an overconfidence in the validity
of complex explanations probably contributes to the allure
of neuroscience. This allure confers on brain branded products a sense of credibility.
The Power of Pictures
What we see is influenced by our biases, and, in turn,
what we see influences our beliefs and behaviors. Pictures,
more than text, affect how consumers remember or anticipate experiences with products (Braun-LaTour et al. 2004).
The power of pictures converges with the allure of neuroscience in neuroimaging. Brain imaging studies have
disproportionate credibility in the scientific community
(Chatterjee 2005; Fellows et al. 2005) as well as with the
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public. Articles summarizing cognitive neuroscience research using brain images are rated more highly for scientific reasoning than articles with bar graphs, topographical
maps, or no images (McCabe and Castel 2008). Functional
images resemble other structural medical images such as xrays or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans and may
be viewed as pictures of an active brain, rather than as statistical maps (Henson 2005).
The press often helps dramatize the importance of
brain imaging. An NPR headline proclaims, “Neuroscientist Uses Brain Scan to See Lies Form”(Temple-Raston
2007). Other press reports construe brain images as establishing causation, claiming that “brain imaging provides visual proof that acupuncture alleviates pain” (Racine,
Bar-Ilan, and Illes 2005) or “School bullies—Is the Amygdala to Blame?”(Malka 2008). A study of 132 press articles
on functional MRI (fMRI) published between 1994 and 2004
found that two-thirds of articles made no mention of limitations of fMRI methods (Racine, Bar-Ilan, and Illes 2006). The
dramatic pronouncements made in press articles combined
with vivid brain pictures contribute to people’s belief that
functional brain images reveal more than they do.
Vulnerability of Patients
While the allure of neuroscience and the power of pictures
can bias most people’s ability to judge complex explanations, these factors take on added force in patients and
caregivers who are confronted with difficult health care
decisions. In this context, lack of control and desire for a
particular outcome can further push patients into believing
claims made by brain brands.
People tend to evaluate evidence in a way that confirms
their prior beliefs (Nickerson 1998). Lord found that people
evaluating evidence for and against the deterrent effects of
capital punishment were apt to accept evidence that validated their existing views at face value and to be critical
of disconfirming evidence (Lord 1979). Furthermore, participants’ attitudes become more extreme in the direction
of their initial point of view when presented with mixed
evidence (Miller 1993). These observations raise the possibility that physicians and patients who wish to believe
in the accuracy of diagnostic technologies or the efficacy of
therapeutic interventions might be inclined to believe in the
claims being made even when these claims are inadequately
supported or the evidence is mixed.
People with chronic diseases have limited control over
their illnesses (Ackerman 1982). Their symptoms may be unpredictable and treatments limited. Regardless of the condition of their health, people who lack a sense of control
are disposed to infer causes where there are none. Whitson
and colleagues (Whitson and Galinsky 2008) showed that
healthy participants who lacked control were more likely to
form false correlations from stock market data, develop conspiracy beliefs, and make superstitious causal connections.
Patients with limited control over the course of their diseases might be similarly disposed to believe unwarranted
causal claims when facing the promises of brain brands.
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CONCLUSION
As neuroscience advances, the gap between scientific and
clinical knowledge and public understanding widens. Scientists have a responsibility to communicate science to the
public and offer antidotes to the press’ tendencies to simplify, exaggerate, and dramatize findings. Clinicians have
a responsibility to guide patients making important health
care decisions that involve a biological understanding of
mind. These responsibilities are particularly important because the allure of neuroscience, the power of brain images,
and patients’ conditions and desires make them especially
vulnerable to the claims of the brain brands.
Clinicians should be vigilant when scientific and commercial enterprises combine. They should be concerned
when neuroscience is used prematurely and when it is
misused to sell diagnostic or therapeutic products. Independently conducted peer-reviewed research in support of
diagnostic utility or therapeutic efficacy remains the gold
standard. Considering that many brain brand products fall
short of this standard, what might clinicians suggest that
buyers bear in mind? Buyers should be wary of brain brands
that rely on the scientific authority of individuals with financial interests in the company. They should be wary when
products emphasize anecdotes, testimonials, and press releases, and are adorned with pretty pictures. When such
marketing practices are evident, products deserve further
scrutiny. Does the seller frame unproven hypotheses as foregone conclusions? Does the seller misrepresent the science
behind the product? Does the use of the product violate the
basic norms of clinical practice? Sensitivity to such questions
will help physicians better advocate for the responsible care
of their patients, and will help patients be better and more
critical consumers of health care technologies. 
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